Symbolic execution Satisfiability modulo theory
Introduction
As modern embedded system design becomes more complex, malicious insiders have more opportunities to modify the hardware with hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans are a type of malicious code that cause insertions, deletions and modifications to the original hardware design. They can threaten integrity, confidentiality and availability by altering the original function of the design, leaking sensitive information ( Jin and Makris, 2010 ) and reducing the reliability of the hardware. design objects, Trojans have different characteristics. A trigger may be classified as either an external trigger or an internal trigger. An internal-trigger uses an activation condition based on a particular input pattern, an internal logic state or counter value ( Tehranipoor and Koushanfar, 2010 ) . Time and data can be used as activation conditions of an internal-trigger. Hardware Trojans triggered with time are called time-bombs. Time-bombs cause serious threats to many high security areas because they are only affected by the internal system clock. System clocks do not need to be controlled by attackers who have to access to a hardware system. If a time-bomb is activated after a very long time, it will be very difficult to detect it because the testers may not have enough time to test all the code for time-bombs. Although formal validation techniques can verify all possible input values, it cannot prove that a time-bomb will never go off ( Waksman and Sethumadhavan, 2011 ) . Hardware Trojans triggered with data are called cheat codes. Cheat codes are the keys to identifying the payload of hardware Trojans. This work detects internal-trigger hardware Trojans.
Up to now, most literature focuses on post-fabrication detection which analyses IC chips, such as side channel technology. However, designers usually implement the functions at register-transfer level (RTL) code. Trojans inserted in the design at the register-transfer abstraction level or higher can be detected in RTL design. If Trojans are inserted in the gatelevel netlist or later design stages, they can be detected by using equivalence checking tools for original RTL code ( Fern and Cheng, 2016 ) .
The aim of this study was to generate efficient test patterns for detecting internally triggered hardware Trojans in RTL code. We proposed a test generation method for hardware Trojans in RTL code. First, the synthesizable Verilog code was analyzed to generate the control flow graphs (CFGs). Next, parallel symbolic execution was implemented and a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver was used to generate the test pattern. Finally, metamorphic testing detected internal triggered hardware Trojans by using the test pattern.
The contributions of our method include:
(1) We generated more precise and effective CFGs by representing a Verilog statement as a node of a CFG. (2) We implemented a parallel symbolic execution algorithm for the synthesizable Verilog code. The algorithm generated test patterns which could detect hardware Trojans. (3) Verilog expressions were converted to SMT-LIBv2 expressions. SMT-LIBv2 is supported by many popular SMT solvers, making it very flexible to choose an SMT solver to implement our method. (4) Metamorphic testing was used to detect hardware Trojans.
There is no need to use a golden circuit to compare the outputs of a Design Under Test (DUT) because metamorphic testing just verifies one or some metamorphic relationships among inputs and outputs.
The rest of the paper has the following structure: in Section 2 we discuss the hardware Trojan detection technologies in post-fabrication stage, physical design stage and functional design stage. In Section 3 we describe the details of our method which include the implementation of two phases: parallel symbolic execution based test generation and metamorphic testing. In Section 4 we analyze the Trust-Hub benchmarks by our method. In Section 5 we discuss the experimental results and conclude the features of our method as well as future work.
Background

Detecting hardware Trojans in IC chips
The detection difficulty is highest at this stage because of prohibitive time and cost requirements ( Jacob et al., 2014 ) . Current detection techniques mostly focus on post-fabrication stages and use a golden chip as a reference model. Side channel analysis and logic tests are two approaches in this stage ( Bhunia et al., 2014 ) . The side channel analysis can passively detect the hardware Trojan's side channel signal. Logic tests activate the hardware Trojans by using appropriate test patterns. Side channel analysis has been widely used to detect hardware Trojans because the inserted Trojans would affect the power consumption ( Shende and Ambawade, 2016 ) , current, signal delay and electromagnetic emanation ( Ngo et al., 2015 ) of infected circuits. Unfortunately, side channel analysis requires long simulation time and relies on a golden model to compare the measured parameters for identifying a Trojan-inserted one. In many situations, it is difficult to obtain a golden model. Even if a golden model can be used, a small Trojan in a large circuit is very difficult to detect by side channel analysis because modern IC chips are becoming more and more complex.
Detecting hardware Trojans in gate-level netlists
The detection difficulty at the gate-level is medium ( Jacob et al., 2014 ) because the netlist is used to produce IC chips. Compared with chips, gate-level netlists provide more design information. While many ATPG (Automatic Test Pattern Generation) tools are used at the gate-level, traditional ATPG tools are not useful for detecting hardware Trojans because their activation probability is very low. Random pattern test generation was proposed by Xue et al. (2014 ) dividing the DUT into regions based on heuristic partitions to reduce the analysis complexity. After this, a sequence of test vectors generated the ordering test vectors which introduced maximum switching activities in the regions. Finally, power ports were placed for localized transient current analysis. The generation of the test patterns was based on the circuit's structure and the power dissipation should be monitored during scan test. Some random algorithms have been used to generate the test patterns, such as the Genetic Algorithm. Saha et al. (2015 ) proposed a Genetic Algorithm based ATPG which was improved to detect small combinational and sequential hardware Trojans. The Genetic Algorithm detected many trigger conditions which were hard to be excited and the remaining unresolved trigger conditions were handled with a SAT(Boolean satisfiability) tool. The SAT tool returned the input vectors when trigger conditions were satisfiable. Random methods are very time-consuming and cannot guarantee finding Trojans in limited amounts of time. Wang et al. (2016 ) proved this conclusion by some experiments and evaluated the signal probability to judge rare events which triggered small combinational Trojans. Test patterns were generated by comparing the probability with a threshold. The challenge of this method was how to find a compact set of patterns that cover all rare events.
Besides test pattern generation, some other methods have been proposed to detect hardware Trojans in netlists, such as information flow technology and pattern matching. Gate-level information flow tracking realized the information flow technology in a gate-level circuit. By adding security labels to input signals, Gate-level information flow tracking generated a new gate-level circuit with security lattices. By tracking the information flow, new gate-level circuits are able to detect hardware Trojans. Although this approach is effective, adding labels to the original circuit increasing the complexity of the original netlist by 2 ^ n . Here, "n " was the number of input signals. ( Zhang and Xu, 2013 ) . Our work focuses on Trojans in RTL code.
Detecting hardware Trojan in RTL design
Traditional tools, such as ATPG, are not useful for RTL code because they are based on gate-level techniques ( Mirzaei et al., 2013 ) . To solve this, Banga and Hsiao (2010 ) proposed a Trojan detection technique in third party RTL using ATPG tools and equivalence checking. Mutation testing was used to detect hardware Trojans in Unspecified Functionality ( Fern and Cheng, 2016 ) . Mutation testing inserts artificial errors into the design code. If a mutation is detected, the test vector is useful. Otherwise, a new test vector should be generated. One drawback of mutation analysis is it's long run-time and the large manual effort required to analyze undetected mutants.
Unspecified hardware Trojans never violate the design specification because they do not alter the logic functions specified ( Fern et al., 2017 ) . To handle this issue, Fern used PyVerilog to directly analyze Verilog/VHDL code to detect unspecified hardware Trojans. SMT or boolean formulas for primary outputs were built from traversing the data-flow graph by PySMT. The formulas for "dangerous" functionality were transformed to satisfiability problems. If a formula was satisfied, the signal was flagged as dangerous. A mutual approach was used to identify (signal, condition) pairs which were the key to detecting unspecified hardware Trojans. PyVerilog ( Takamaeda-Yamazaki, 2015 ) is a Hardware Design Processing Toolkit, which is written in Python for Verilog. This open-source toolkit consists of four libraries including a parser, data-flow analyzer, control-flow analyzer and Verilog code generator. Unlike PyVerilog, we implemented a control-flow analyzer by using Antlr4 and the outputs of our control-flow graph are different from PyVerilog. A node in our control-flow graph represents a statement instead of an operator or operand.
Some other methods which don't use test vectors have been proposed. Based on the principle of GLIFT, RTLIFT ( Ardeshiricham et al., 2017 ) precisely measured all digital flows through RTL designs by adding Information Flow Tracking to the original Verilog code. The approach formally proved security properties related to integrity, confidentiality and logic side channels. For each operation, the number of output signals became twice of original input signals. The increasing number of input signals may increase the complexity and scale of original design circuit.
3.
The symbolic execution based test pattern generation
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , our method is composed of two phases.
Phase 1. The parse-tree of synthesizable Verilog code was generated by Antlr4 ( Parr, 2013 ) . Next, the CFGs of Verilog code were generated by our work. Based on the CFGs, parallel symbolic execution technology was implemented to get Path Conditions(PCs). PCs were solved with an SMT solver and the satisfiable test vectors were generated.
Phase 2. The satisfiable test vectors were analyzed with metamorphic testing to detect hardware Trojans.
In Phase 1, symbolic execution was used to discover the relationship between input variables and output variables. Obtaining the relationship is key to generating the test vectors which can discover Trojans. King (1976 ) proposed symbolic execution for program testing. Symbolic execution is a very useful program analysis technique. High-coverage test suites can be generated by symbolic execution and deep errors can be found too. It becomes practical because of the advances of constraint satisfiability. The basic idea is to represent the values of variables with the symbolic values of input variables. Symbolic execution can be implemented by the control flow of a program. Each execution path has a path condition which is a symbolic path constraint. During the process of symbolic execution, symbolic variables are mapped to symbolic expressions and Path Conditions(PCs). With the help of an SMT solver, PCs are solved. If a PC is satisfiable, an SMT solver can discover the values of input variables. A test vector set is generated according to the execution paths of the program. A symbolic execution path is composed of a sequence of conditional statements which are obtained from control flow graphs.
SMT can solve constraint-satisfaction problems. SMT is the core theory to solve the problems in many application areas, such as program analysis, test generation, verification. Modern SMT solvers decide the satisfiability of conjunctions of literals ( De Moura and Bjørner, 2011 ) . SMT provides a much richer modeling language than SAT. SMT-LIB calls an SMT solver that implements a procedure for satisfiability modulo theory ( Barrett et al., 2017 ) . SMT-LIB provides standard rigorous descriptions of background theories used in SMT systems, and it also develops and promotes common input and output languages for many different SMT solvers. Now SMT-LIBv2 is supported by many SMT solvers, such as Z3, Alt-Ergo, raSAT, SMTInterpol, SMT-RAT, Yices.
In Phase 2, the test generation was used to discover Trojans in RTL code. Usually, the outputs of test vectors are observed and used to compare the expectation results. In this study, we focused on metamorphic relationships rather than the value of output variables. Metamorphic testing ( Chen et al., 1998 ) is used to check the correctness in software and alleviate the oracle problem. This method checks the relationships among inputs and outputs to discover abnormal code in programs. The relationships are called metamorphic relations. Metamorphic relations are the intrinsic properties of a program. A metamorphic relation violation refers to a checked error in a program ( Yi et al., 2013 ) . For example, let us consider a program that implements the cosine function. One of the properties of a cosine function is: cos( x ) = cos( − x ). If there is the relation between inputs: x 1 = x 2 , the relation of outputs should satisfy cos( x 1 ) = cos( − x 2 ). If the relation of outputs does not satisfy cos( x 1 ) = cos( − x 2 ), some faults must exist in the program. Metamorphic relations should be built according to the specifications of design.
Test generation for Verilog code
The control flow graph generated in this study was different from PyVerilog. Usually a node in a CFG represents an operator or a variable. In our work, a node in a CFG represented a statement in Verilog code.
The node of a CFG
Definition 1. a control flow graph is a directed graph, CFG = < V, E > . Where V is the set of vertices of the CFG and E is the set of edges of the CFG. A vertex v,v ∈ V , has the following characteristics:
(1) v is a quadruple(S, T, PRE, NEXT).
(2) S is a statement in Verilog code.
(3) T is the type of S. We define the types of synthesizable Verilog statements, such as ALWAYS and ALWAYS_END. An ENTER node is added to start the CFG, and an EXIT node is added to end the CFG. (4) PRE is the set of previous nodes of S. (5) NEXT is the set of next nodes of S.
The edge of a CFG
Definition 2. An edge e = < v, u > , e ∈ E, v ∈ V, u ∈ V is the control relation between two nodes when Verilog code execute s . An edge e has the following characteristics:
(1) The edge between two control nodes is a control relation.
(2) The edge between a control node and an assign node is a control relation. (3) The edge between two assign nodes is an execution sequence, not a control relation. (4) There is parallel execution among the statements of "always", "instantiation" and "assign". (5) Nodes in PRE and NEXT can be found by control region of nodes and execution sequence.
Control flow graph(CFG) generation for Verilog code
In Algorithm 1 , function CFGGeneration() read a Verilog file and extracted the basic grammar information from a parse tree. The most important grammar information for a node in a CFG includes node.index,node.controlIndex,node.type. Node.index is the index of a statement. Node.controlIndex is the index of control statement of the current node. The main grammar information of the lines 94-101 in the Appendix B was listed in Table 1 . The control relationship is described in Fig 2 . The function connectControlFlowListVariable() created the edge of CFG.
Fig. 2 -The CFG of uart.v (drawn by Graphviz).
Parallel symbolic execution
The symbolic execution of Verilog code is described in Algorithm 2 . Algorithm 2 is a recursive function. The function fileControlFlowList() is the start of the entire analysis. The input of the algorithm is a synthesizable Verilog file(VC.v). The CFGs of VC.v were generated by Algorithm 1 . Next, the filename of instantiation statements were obtained and the instantiation nodes were analyzed by calling fileControlFlowList(). After the code of instantiation files(subModuleVC.v) were analyzed, the PCs(subPCs) of noninput variables were returned. When all the subPCs were returned, the parallel symbolic execution thread symbolExecutionThread() started to analyze the always statements and continuous assign statements. The threads returned the PCs of variables at the left of statements. A flag variable, nonInput_variable.isDone , would be set "true" if the PCs of a non-input variable were obtained. Input_variable.isDone would be set "true" in the stage of initialization. When nonInput_variable.isDone was set "true", the sub-threads which were halted because the nonInput_variable.isDone was equal to "false" would continue to run.
An optimization during the progress of parallel symbolic execution is possible. If PCs are not satisfiable, they may be deleted during symbolic execution, reducing the number of PCs and consequently the execution time and memory required.
Loop dependency problem and randomizing internal variables
Loop dependencies are a complex situation in RTL code. For example, the code in Listing 1 has loop dependencies because the variable "count_in" exists at both sides of " < = " at the same time. "count_in" is a non-input variable.
During symbolic execution, we replaced the variable on the left side of an assignment with the variable on the right side. If a variable is on both sides of an assignment, it means the variable is replaced by itself. The result cannot be solved by symbolic execution which uses input variables and constants to express an output variable. As an internal counter, "count_in" is only affected by the system clock. The system clock is a special signal which cannot be directly added to the expression of "count_in" because the system clock variable "sys_clk" never appears in the right side of an assignment. In our experimental Verilog code there are two assignments about "count_in": "count_in < = 32 h0" and "count_in < = count_in + 1 b1". If "count_in" is replaced with "0", the symbolic expression can be solved during symbolic execution. Replacing "count_in" with "count_in + 1" leads to an endless loop and symbolic execution cannot go on because "count_in" isn't an input variable or constant.
To solve the problem of loop dependencies, during symbolic execution we converted "count_in" into a random variable which was regarded as an input variable causing some internal variables to become global random variables. The global random variables revealed some important internal conditions. For the code in Listing 1 , "count_in" was replaced with "RANDOM_filename_M_count_in". The path condition "count_in = = 32 hffffffff" equalled "RANDOM_filename_ M_count_in = = 32 hffffffff". The solver got a satisfiable result: "RANDOM_filename_M_count_in = #xffffffff ". One PC for "count_in" was "RANDOM_filename_M_count_in = = 0xffffffff" and the other PC for "count_in" was "RANDOM_ filename_M_count_in! = 0xffffffff". "count_in" is an internal variable, the trigger of a hardware Trojan, and a counter which determines the value of the system clock. When "count_in" was equal to "0xffffffff", a hardware Trojan payload was activated.
Converting internal variables into random variables can overapproximate the set of values that the variable takes during the course of execution, which will lead to spurious states and false positives . To solve this problem, we used constraint conditions to represent the internal variables' special values range. For example, we represented "count_in > = 5 and count_in < = 0xfffffffe" with a constraint condition and we Algorithm 2 -parallel symbolic execution. if (count_in = = 32 hffffffff) begin DataSend_ena < = 1 b1; count_in < = 32 b0; end else count_in < = count_in + 1 b1;
added the constraint condition to the path conditions after symbolic execution. A new path condition has the SMT-LIBv2 format: (and (constraint conditions) (a path condition)). If a new path condition is not solved, a satisfiable result cannot be achieved. As a result, the overapproximation problem can be avoided. To prove the function of constraint conditions, the Verilog code in Listing 1 was modified in Listing 2 .
Listing 2 -Verilog code with infeasible trigger.
if ( ∼sys_rst_l) begin DataSend_ena < = 1 b0; count_in < = 32 h5; // count_in's values from 5 to 0xfffffffe end else if (count_in = = 32 hfffffffe) begin DataSend_ena < = 1 b1; count_in < = 32 h5; // count_in's values from 5 to 0xfffffffe end else if (count_in < 5) // infeasible condition count_in < = 32 hfffffffe; else count_in < = count_in + 1 b1;
Listing 3 -The SMT-LIBv2 statements include the infeasible condition. They can be tested in Z3 ( https://rise4fun. com/ Z3/ tutorial/ guide ). The result is "unsat" (unsatisfiable).
(declare-const RANDOM_u_xmit_M_count_in (_ BitVec 32)) (assert (and (and (bvule RANDOM_u_xmit_M_count_in #xfffffffe) (bvuge RANDOM_u_xmit_M_count_in #x00000005)) (bvult RANDOM_u_xmit_M_count_in #x00000005))) (check-sat)
In Listing 2 the constraint condition of "count_in" is "(and (bvule count_in #xfffffffe) (bvuge count_in 5))". The path condition of "count_in < 5" is "(bvult count_in 5)". The total path condition is "(and (and (bvule count_in #xfffffffe) (bvuge count_in 5)) (bvult count_in 5))". During symbolic execution, we replaced "count_in" with "RANDOM_filename_M_count_in ", the condition was transformed to: "(and (and (bvule RANDOM_filename_M_count_in #xfffffffe) (bvuge RANDOM_filename_M_count_in 5)) (bvult RANDOM_filename_M_count_in 5))" Listing 3 consists of the SMT-LIBv2 statements used to test the infeasible condition. The result is unsatisfiable, so no according test vector is generated and metamorphic testing does not handle the infeasible condition.
SMT solver and test generation
PCs which had the Verilog grammar format were converted to SMT-LIBv2 format in our method. Afterwards, Z3 ( Microsoft, 2017 ) which was a SMT solver from Microsoft Research was used to solve the PCs.
Convert Verilog statement to SMT-LIBv2 format : A Verilog statement is an infix expression while a SMT-LIBv2 statement is prefix expression. Z3 cannot solve a PC which is an infix expression. An infix expression should be converted to a prefix expression. To solve this problem, Algorithm 3 was proposed. During the conversion, Verilog operators were replaced with SMT-LIBv2 operators. The operator conversion between Verilog and SMT-LIBv2 are listed in Appendix A .
The function convertToBitVector( element ) changed the format of "element " to SMT-LIBv2. The function convertToSMTAlgorithm 3 -Convert infix expression of Verilog to prefix expression of SMT-LIBv2.
Operator( operator ) converted the "operator " of Verilog to SMTLIBv2 operator. The function operatorHandle() dealt with the priority of operators.
For example, an infix expression of Verilog, (rec_dataH_rec = = xmit_dataH) && (rec_dataH_rec = = {x_START,x_WAIT,x_SHIFT[1:0]}), was converted to prefix expression SMT-LIBv2 : (add ( = rec_dataH_rec xmit_dataH) ( = rec_dataH_rec (concat x_START (concat x_WAIT ((_ extract 1 0) x_SHIFT))))). Test generation : If a PC was satisfiable, the values of input variables were obtained. For example, after Z3 solved the statement:
(rec_dataH_rec = = xmit_dataH) && (rec_dataH_rec = = 76), the result from the Z3 was "rec_dataH_rec = xmit_dataH and rec_dataH_rec = 76". We got an input vector which included "xmit_dataH = 76"("rec_dataH_rec" is not an input variable).
Metamorphic testing
To verify the test generation generated in Section 3.1 , metamorphic testing was used to detect the hardware Trojan. In our research, Trust-Hub RS-232 benchmarks were used, so we defined the metamorphic relation of RS-232 as following:
where X is an 8-bits data input which should be sent out by a sender. Y is an 8-bit data output which is acquired by the receiver. The function of RS-232 is that a sender transmits X 
T300 T400 T500
Trojan trigger Trigger is a 32-bit counter("count_in"). When "count_in" reaches 32 hFFFFFFFF, the payload becomes activated.
Trigger compares transmitted and received data("xmit_dataH", "rec_dataH_rec"). If both equal 8 h4C the payload becomes activated.
Trigger is a 32-bit counter("count_in"). When "count_in" reaches 32 hFFFFFFFF the payload becomes activated.
Trojan payload Payload replaces the 7th bit of all transmitted data after the payload was activated.
4 bits of received data are replaced by the payload.
"xmit_doneH" is stuck at '0 . Because "0 1 = 1" and "0 0 = 0", "0" can detect abnormal "1" by XOR. Because "1 0 = 1" and "1 1 = 0", "1" can detect abnormal "0" by XOR. So when 8-bits of "0"(00000000) are sent to a receiver, "00000000" should be received. If Y is not equal to "00000000", abnormal "1"s and their locations can be detected according to the result of ( Y i Y j ). If 8-bits of "1"(11111111) are sent, abnormal "0"s and their locations can be detected in the same way.
For example, "X = (0000,0000) 2 " was sent twice, then "Y i = (0000,0000) 2 " and "Y j = (0100,0111) 2 " were received. "Y i Y j = (0100,0111) 2 " meant that four abnormal "1"s were detected at 6th,2th,1th,0th bit.
In-fact, it is very important to test the metamorphic relation in many network protocols.
Experiments and results
The time-bomb and cheat codes in RTL codes are difficult to detect. To detect them, symbolic execution and metamorphic testing were used in this study. The Trust-Hub benchmark ( Salmani et al., 2013; Shakya et al., 2017 ) RS-232-T300, T400 and T500 were analyzed. Compared with PyVerilog, our work generated more precise CFGs and disclosed the relationships between statements. By using an SMT solver, test patterns were compacted effectively which increased the speed of analysis. The Trojans in the three benchmarks were detected by the test vectors and the abnormal bits of output variables were detected. Three Verilog files were analyzed: uart.v, u_xmit.v, u_rec.v. The source code of uart.v in T300 was attached in Appendix B. Table 2 describes the details of three Trojans. T300 and T500 had time triggers. T400 had a data trigger.
Test generation for Verilog code
Control flow graph generation for Verilog code
To identify the variables in all Verilog files, we added a prefix before each variable. The prefix has the format: "file- name_M_". So the variables in uart.v would add a prefix "uart_M_". If a variable is changed to a random variable, a prefix "RANDOM_" will be added. Before symbolic execution, the CFGs of RTL code were generated. The CFG of "uart.v" in Trust-Hub RS-232 T300 is shown in Fig. 2 . The name of node has the format: "nodetype_lineNo". So "INSTANTIATION_79" in Fig. 2 means the node type is INSTANTIATION and the instantiation statement is at line 79 in uart.v. " [uart_M_rec_dataH] " meant that the variable "rec_dataH" was changed between always statements line 94 and 101. ENTER is the first node and EXIT is the last node.
Symbolic execution and test generation
The test vectors were generated for each output variable. It was convenient to test one output signals or all output signals.
Trust-Hub RS-232 T300 : Table 3 shows the results of symbolic execution. In fact, some of the test vectors are the same for different output variables. For instance, reset signal "sys_rst_l" resets the whole circuit and affects all outputs. Table 4 shows the detail of test vectors of "uart_M_uart_XMIT_dataH ". The first test vector means that the reset signal "uart_M_sys_rst_l" (in top file) is enabled. The second test vector means that an input signal "xmitH" in uart.v was "0" and the reset signal "uart_M_sys_rst_l" is disabled. But two internal signals "RANDOM_u_xmit_M_count_in" and "RANDOM_u_xmit_M_bitCell_cntrH" must satisfy conditions "0xFFFFFFFF" and "15", respectively. When "count_in" was equal to "0xFFFFFFFF", it activated a Trojan payload by setting internal signal "DataSend_ena = 1". Detection detail was described in Section 4.2 . "uart_M_xmit_dataH(random)" means always @ (negedge sys_rst_l or posedge xmitH) begin if ( ∼sys_rst_l) begin DataSend_ena < = 1 b0; count_in < = 32 h0; end else if (count_in = = 32 hffffffff) begin DataSend_ena < = 1 b1;//trigger count_in < = 32 h0; end else count_in < = count_in + 1 b1; end that the input variable "uart_M_xmit_dataH" could be any value in its value ranges. "RANDOM_u_xmit_M_state = 0" means the start state of a finite-state machine in u_xmit.v. Listing 4 shows the source code of trigger. We detected this internal trigger condition by randomizing internal variable "count_in" in u_xmit.v during the process of symbolic execution.
Trust-Hub RS-232 T400 : Listing 5 shows the code of the trigger in T400. The trigger's condition is "(rec_dataH_rec = = xmit_dataH) && (rec_dataH_rec = = {x_START, x_WAIT, x_SHIFT[1:0]})". The condition means that input 8-bits "xmit_dataH" was equal to output 8-bits "rec_dataH" and both of them were equal to "76"({x_START, x_WAIT, x_SHIFT[1:0]} = 010 011 00). Table 5 lists the number of test vectors of each output variable. The second test vector in Table 6 activates the payload. Detection detail was described in Section 4.2 .
Trust-Hub RS-232 T500 : Listing 6 shows the trigger circuit in T500. Table 7 lists the number of test vectors of each output variable. Table 8 lists the test vectors of "uart_XMIT_dataH" 
Metamorphic testing
According to Section 3.2 , let X = uart_M_xmit_dataH, Y = uart_M_rec_dataH. Input X was used twice. The first X was X i, and the second X was X j, making X i equal to X j . The test vectors in Section 4.1 were used after X i was set and before X j was set. The abnormal outputs were detected after a test vector was used. The object of the experiments was to test the metamorphic relationship between Y i and Y j . Hardware Trojans were detected according to the results of metamorphic testing.
Trust-Hub RS-232 T300
In Table 9 , Y i is the output of X i before the second and third test vectors in Table 4 were used and Y j is the output of X j after the two test vectors were used. According to the results of ( Y i Y j ) in Table 9 and 8 abnormal outputs were detected. By using "0", one abnormal "1" was detected at the 7th bit in the result of ( Y i Y j ). Figs. 3 and 4 show the result affected by the Trojan after the test vectors were used. In Fig. 3 the internal variable "count_in" in u_xmit.v reaches "0xFFFFFFFF" at the location where X was equal to "0 x00" again. Before X j was set "0 x00", X i = Y i . After X j was set "0 x00", some abnormal Y j were detected in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 4 , X was set "0xff" and one abnormal bit is detected. The data in Fig. 3 is shown in the left part of Table  9 and the data in Fig. 4 is shown in the right part. The hardware Trojan was detected by the randomized internal variable. The location of abnormal bits was consistent with the Trojan description in Table 2 . The branch coverage of uart.v, u_xmit and u_rec.v were 100%, 100% and 93.8%, respectively.
Trust-Hub RS-232 T400
There is a data trigger in T400. After X j was set "0 x4c", two abnormal outputs are detected in the result of ( Y i Y j ) in Table  10 . By using "0", two abnormal "1"s are detected at the 0th and 6th bits in ( Y i Y j ). By using "1", two abnormal "0"s are detected at the 5th and 7th bit. Figs. 5 and 6 were the results generated by simulating in QuestaSim 10. The data in Fig. 5 is listed in the left part of Table 10 and data in Fig. 6 is listed in the right part. The hardware Trojan was detected by the special input value "0 x4c". The locations of abnormal bits were in line with the Trojan description in Table 2 . The branch coverage of uart.v, u_xmit and u_rec.v were 100%, 100% and 93.8%, respectively.
Trust-Hub RS-232 T500
The value of internal variable "count_in" in u_xmit.v reaches "0xFFFFFFFF" before the X was set "0 x00" or "0xff" again. After "count_in" reached "0xFFFFFFFF" some abnormal outputs were detected in Figs. 7 and 8 . By using "0", eight "1"s are detected in ( Y i Y j ), so all bits are abnormal. By using "1", eight "1"s are detected, so all bits are abnormal. Figs. 7 and 8 are the results by simulating in QuestaSim 10. The abnormal "xmit_done" is found in Figs. 7 and 8 when abnormal results were detected in ( Y i Y j ) in Table 11 . The hardware Trojan was detected by the randomized internal variable. The abnormal outputs("rec_dataH" and "xmit_doneH") were consistent with the Trojan description in Table 2 . The branch coverage of uart.v, u_xmit and u_rec.v were 100%, 97.6% and 93.8%, respectively. 0 x1 0 x81 1000,0000 0xfe 0 xfe 0xfe 0000,0000 0 x2 0 x2 0 x82 1000,0000 0xfd 0xfd 0xfd 0000,0000 0 x4 0 x4 0 x84 1000,0000 0xfb 0xfb 0xfb 0000,0000 0 x8 0 x8 0 x88 1000,0000 0xf7 0xf7 0xf7 0000,0000 0 x10 0 x10 0 x90 1000,0000 0xef 0xef 0xef 0000,0000 0 x20 0 x20 0xa0 1000,0000 0xdf 0xdf 0xdf 0000,0000 0 x40 0 x40 0xc0 1000,0000 0xbf 0xbf 0xbf 0000,0000 0 x80 0 x80 0 x80 0000,0000 0 x7f 0 x7f 0xff 1000,0000 
Discussions and conclusions
To generate test patterns for hardware Trojan detection, control flow analysis, symbolic execution, SMT and metamorphic testing were used in our work. CFGs were generated by analyzing the grammar of the Verilog code. By walking the CFGs, Symbolic execution executed the multi-threads to replace the non-input variables with input variables and random variables in PCs. Z3 was used to solve the PCs to discover the satisfiable input vectors. The satisfiable input vectors were detected by metamorphic testing to detect the abnormal outputs which may be caused by hardware Trojan s . In our work, the key was the randomizing of the internal variables during symbolic execution. The randomizing found out the internal variables which were affected by internal conditions . Path Conditions including randomizing internal variables were also constructed, which detected the internal conditions triggered only by system clock or a special internal constant. Unlike the random pattern test generation, our work detects the triggers with more accuracy and certainty, less randomness. Because the test vectors are generated according to statements branch of RTL code, our method has very high branch coverage. Our work can be used during the process of the RTL design to discover suspicious conditions and internal variables. It also provides a more accurate and concise test generation which can also be used to detect the design errors in RTL code written by Verilog DHL. This work is a very important base for future effort to detect the more complex internal time and data triggers.
